By Lewis Loflin
In 1932, H.G. Wells, a Fabian socialist and influential thinker, spoke at Oxford, suggesting, “Progressives must become liberal fascists and enlightened Nazis.” His words hinted at a vision of Progressivism that embraced strong state authority. Decades later, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese Americans during World War II reflected a similar willingness to prioritize collective goals over individual rights.
In the 2008 election debates, Hillary Clinton distanced herself from “liberal,” preferring “modern Progressive.” She admired Saul Alinsky (1909–1972), a community organizer whose ideas shaped groups like ACORN. In her 1969 thesis, There Is Only the Fight: An Analysis of the Alinsky Model, she noted on page 74: “The middle class is fertile ground for organizing, and Alinsky thinks, for radicalizing… (their frustration) could be channeled into achieving radical goals. The secret… is that such goals must be perceived as paralleling self-interest.” This suggests a strategy of aligning collective change with personal gain.
Jonah Goldberg defines fascism as:
Fascism is a religion of the state. It assumes the organic unity of the body politic and longs for a national leader attuned to the will of the people. It is totalitarian in that it views everything as political and holds that any action by the state is justified to achieve the common good. It takes responsibility for all aspects of life, including our health and well-being, and seeks uniformity of thought and action, whether by force or through regulation and social pressure. Everything, including the economy and religion, must align with its objectives. Any rival identity is part of “the problem” and thus defined as the enemy.
While not identical to historical fascism, Progressivism shares traits with state-centric ideologies, blending democratic forms with collectivist aims. For more, see George Reisman’s Why Nazism Was Socialism and Why Socialism Is Totalitarian, available on Amazon. Alinsky sought change from below; Clinton and others prefer it from above, using similar methods.
Clinton framed classical liberalism (18th–19th century) as “freedom, the freedom to achieve, to stand against big power in behalf of the individual,” adding, “In the last 30–40 years, it has been turned on its head… made to seem [it] describes big government…” Historically, classical liberalism meant freedom from government interference and strong property rights. Her version implies government stepping in to protect individuals, often by managing their choices—a shift toward what’s been called a “nanny state.”
She suggests “liberal” has been unfairly linked to big government. Yet classical liberalism, rooted in laissez-faire economics, differs sharply from modern liberalism and Progressivism. Clinton emphasizes collective effort—“We are better as a society when we are working together”—but this raises questions about where individual rights fit. Her “freedom” focuses on reducing inequality within a group, not personal autonomy, echoing J.J. Rousseau’s socialist ideas. “Helping those without advantages” often translates to centralized policies, not individual empowerment.
Clinton calls Progressivism an “American” ideal, but its roots trace to 19th-century Germany under Otto von Bismarck, who used reforms to strengthen state power.
What do Progressives stand for? Michael Schwalbe, a sociology professor, outlined key views in Common Dreams (May 30, 2008):
These ideas lean toward collective responsibility, often at odds with individual liberty.
Progressivism aligns with non-Soviet socialism, maintaining private ownership in name but favoring state control. Some call America a “mixed” economy—not fully socialist. Yet extensive taxation, regulation, and government partnerships blur that line. When does it become a system prioritizing the collective over the individual? Pew polls show widespread distrust of government, reflecting concerns over its growing role.
Progressivism, like other statist ideologies, emerged as Christianity declined in the late 19th century, with humanist ideas from Europe filling the gap. The state became a stand-in for divine authority, meant to serve the masses. Early Progressives saw it as a tool to build a better world through reason and science, shifting salvation from personal to collective.
Woodrow Wilson expanded state power during World War I, using the Lusitania sinking (1,200 dead) to justify entry, despite evidence it carried munitions. He jailed over 100,000 dissenters and controlled industries, leveraging war to advance his agenda. FDR’s New Deal and Japanese internment followed a similar pattern, though neither dismantled democracy outright—public support wasn’t there. Both used crises to justify broad authority, a tactic echoed elsewhere.
In Europe, Mussolini and Hitler rose through elections, then consolidated power. Progressivism here kept democratic forms but stretched constitutional limits, reflecting Enlightenment influences from France and Germany.
Race shaped Progressive history. The 1920s–30s saw the Ku Klux Klan’s peak and the 1924 Immigration Act limiting Eastern Europeans and Jews, repealed in 1965 amid new immigration debates. Margaret Sanger pushed eugenics—improving society through selective breeding—while FDR interned Japanese Americans and kept a segregated military. Britain’s Progressives blocked Jewish refugees, as in the 1942 Struma tragedy (769 deaths).
Today, Progressives emphasize racial equality, often as a political strategy. Critics argue this prioritizes electoral coalitions—minority voters and affluent allies—over genuine concern, using welfare expansion to secure support. See Why Liberals and Progressives Focus on Race.
Clinton calls herself a “modern Progressive,” distinct from Wilson or FDR’s grand plans. She shares their collectivist bent but focuses on social equality, not utopia. Schwalbe’s ideas reflect this shift, common in academia, where traditional values face scrutiny. Environmental Progressives prioritize nature, sometimes over human needs, blending old socialist goals with new causes. See Parallels Between Environmentalism and Collectivism.
Secular Humanism, per Paul Kurtz’s manifestos, often underpins this, praising Marx while promoting atheism and collective solutions. The state takes a guiding role, led by figures promising broad salvation.
Today, Progressivism can be described as “identity statism”—a focus on collective groups defined by immutable traits like race, gender, or orientation. Rather than class or national unity, modern Progressives organize society around these identities, with the state as the tool to manage outcomes. Policies like racial quotas or gender-based initiatives reflect this, prioritizing group balance over individual merit.
This shift serves a political purpose. By framing issues through identity, Progressives build a power base from coalitions of minority groups and their allies, often emphasizing their role as protectors. Terms like ‘equity’ or ‘privilege’—popular in academic and media circles—reinforce this lens, though some see them as tools to divide rather than unite. I reject buzzwords like ‘systemic’ as vague jargon, often wielded even by white Progressives to distance groups from the broader culture, especially whites, for political gain.
Historically, Progressives used eugenics to ‘improve’ society through group categories; today, they pursue equality through similar collective logic. Both approaches expand state authority, raising the same question: how much individual freedom is traded for these goals?
Progressives often aim to improve society, not harm it. Yet their focus—centralized solutions, collective good—clashes with individual autonomy. They see human nature as malleable, fixable through policy, rooted in a belief in human progress. Critics argue this risks overriding personal freedom when crises, real or created, justify control. From Wells’ state-centric vision to today’s identity statism, this tension persists.
Acknowledgment: I’d like to thank Grok, an AI by xAI, for helping me draft and refine this article. The final edits and perspective are my own.
Further reading: